Introduction
The 2000 presidential election was the worst election in American history. Some may argue that the Tilden-Hayes contest of 1876 was at least as bad. In the 1876 election, not only did the winner of the Electoral College not win a plurality of the national popular vote, but fraud plagued the voting in Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. An Electoral Commission, appointed by Congress, eventually decided the outcome and split along partisan lines to choose Hayes. In the Bush-Gore contest of 2000 the eventual winner of the Electoral College lost the popular vote by over 540,000 votes, and the Supreme Court stepped in with a decision that most view as highly politicized. As I review in this paper, examination of 2000 election ballots in the decisive state of Florida shows that a plurality of the voters there intended to vote for the Democrat, Al Gore, and not the Republican, George W. Bush, notwithstanding the fact that the legal and political process produced a victory for Bush.
Florida in 2000 is mostly not a story of fraud but instead one of defective election administration. Across the state, tabulators simply failed to record all of the intended votes. The intentions of more than 50,000 voters who went to the polls on election day to cast a vote for either Bush or Gore were frustrated, as their effort to produce a ballot that would be counted as valid instead produced a ballot that was discarded as spoiled. Some of the spoiled ballots were undervotes, where the tabulation failed to discern that the voter had marked any choice on the ballot. In places in Florida that used punch card voting machines, undervotes were famously associated with "dimpled chads" and other manifestations of incompletely punched ballots (Greenhouse 2000) . Other spoiled ballots were overvotes, where multiple marks on the ballot made the voter's choice ambiguous.
Some officials, such as Orange County's Elections Supervisor Bill Cowles, argued that the blame for spoiled ballots ultimately rests with the voters, asking "Where does their stupidity enter into the picture?" (Roy and Griffin 2001) .
Across the localities of Florida, the rate and pattern of ballot spoilage in the 2000 election varies systematically with the type of tabulation method used. It is doubtful that voters' stupidity varied systematically with whether, say, poll workers at the voter's precinct advised the voter of any errors on the ballot and gave the voter a chance to correct them. Providing such warnings demonstrably reduced the rate at which overvoted ballots were produced. But it is unquestionable-true by definition-that the quality of the election administration in each locality is linked to the presence of such procedures.
I begin by reviewing some of the evidence that shows that, taking into account the discarded intended votes, the 2000 election in Florida produced the wrong outcome. I begin with a review of the studies, mostly published in newspapers and focused on the overvotes, that have previously suggested such a conclusion. Then I offer my own analysis of available ballot-level data, using a simple model designed to estimate the number of intended major-party votes included among the overvotes. Not all of the overvotes represent bona fide intentions to vote for either Bush or Gore. Some reflect intentions to vote for some other candidate or to spoil the ballot intentionally, and some are simply haphazard punches or scribbles. The model I propose estimates the proportion of the overvotes that were intended to be a vote for either Bush or Gore, based on the vote indicated on each ballot for the U.S. Senate race and on how the overvoted ballots compare to the ballots that have a single choice marked for president.
My discussion emphasizes differences among the various vote tabulation procedures used in Florida in 2000. All but one of Florida's 67 counties used one of four tabulation methods (Division of Elections 1999; Governor's Select Task Force 2001, 43-44) .
1 There were two different kinds of punch card machines, Votomatic machines and Datavote machines, and there were two different modes of handling optically scanned ballots. In some counties the rule was to scan and count the ballots in each precinct, while in others the ballots from all precincts were scanned at a central location. Most of the centrally tabulated ballots also used a potentially confusing format in which the list of presidential candidate names spilled over into a second column (St. Petersburg Times 2001a) . In most cases, the precinct-tabulated systems went with technology that would warn a voter when the ballot the voter cast had more marks for an office than were allowed for that office, and the voter would be given a chance to submit a corrected ballot. The centrally tabulated systems did not include such a warn-and-correct feature. As I shall discuss, in some cases precinct tabulation was used but the warning feature was not operational. Studies of voting systems that have examined the residual vote in counties across the country have found that optical systems are generally superior to punch card systems (Brady, Buchler, Jarvis, and 
Florida 2000 Overvotes Reviewed
The effect that better election procedures in Florida might have had on Bush's official margin of victory over Gore, which was 537 votes, has been extensively examined. Wand, Shotts, Sekhon, Mebane, Herron, and Brady (2001) demonstrate that the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach County caused more than 2,000 voters to vote by mistake for Pat Buchanan instead of Gore, and Herron and Sekhon (2003) show that overvotes in two
Florida counties tended to come from Democrats and consequently diminished Gore's vote total. It is well established that throughout Florida blacks and Democrats tended to be disproportionately affected by voting problems ( The overvoted ballots on which the voter's intent could be clearly determined were principally ballots cast using optical scan equipment. On such ballots frequently the voter filled in the oval for a candidate but then also wrote in the same candidate's name. The tabulation equipment would have routinely rejected such ballots. Another common error on optical ballots was that a voter would vote for two candidates and then cross one out or write a note requesting that the extra vote be ignored (Damron and Roy 2001) . Florida law specified that a vote should be counted whenever the voter's intent can be determined.
In counties where the Votomatic punch card voting machines were used, it was not possible to recover similar information a voter may have written, because none of the reinspection efforts examined the envelopes or ballot stubs used for write-in votes with such machines. For the NORC study, inspectors examined only duplicate ballots that may have been created to transcribe the write-in information. Any such ballot where a voter wrote in a name to try to correct an error would appear in the NORC data to be a ballot on which multiple candidates were selected (Jergovic 2003) .
In all the counties of Florida, whatever type of voting equipment was used, the number of overvotes for which a voter's intent could not be clearly determined in the reinspection processes greatly exceeds the number for which a clear determination may have been possible. Multiple-mark overvotes are ballots on which either Bush or Gore is marked and also more than one other mark is on the ballot. *** Table 1 about here *** Counting all of the overvotes that could be allocated to either Bush or Gore as if they were bona fide votes certainly changes the outcome. Gore gains more than a 45,000 vote margin over Bush. Gore wins in this sense even if only a subset of the allocated overvotes are counted. The write-ins counted as unambiguous in Table 1 are not enough to overcome
Bush's certified margin of 537 votes, but the total of all the write-ins, which nets Gore 847 votes, is sufficient. Note that some of the write-ins that are deemed ambiguous in this accounting might not be ambiguous according to the standards of some of the other ballot reinspections, such as that reported by Damron and Roy (2001) . For instance, an error on an optical ballot that a voter tried to correct by both marking and writing in the preferred candidate's name would be counted as an ambiguous write-in in Table 1 .
Summarizing the allocated write-in ballots for counties that used optical scan equipment
shows that a higher proportion of Gore's votes than Bush's were lost to uncounted write-ins and that more uncounted write-ins occurred with central tabulation than with precinct tabulation. 2 These patterns are apparent in Table 2 , which shows the raw number of unambiguous and ambiguous allocated write-ins and the ratio of the number of write-ins allocated to each candidate to the number of votes officially certified for that candidate. As emphasized in previous reports based on the NORC data (e.g. Bousquet and Tobin 2001) , most of the allocated overvotes have no indication that they are any kind of write-in, rather they are ballots with two marks or more than two marks on them. Table 3 shows how the two-mark and multiple-mark allocated overvotes are distributed across the counties of Florida. The tables show the raw numbers of such ballots in the NORC data and the ratios of the number of allocated overvotes to the certified vote counts, broken down by type of voting machine, tabulation protocol and ballot format.
*** Table 3 The ratios are typically much smaller in counties that used precinct-tabulated optical scan machines. The exceptions are Columbia and Escambia counties, which have ratio results as bad as the one county (Lake) that used centrally tabulated optical machines and ballots with the presidential candidates' names all printed in one column.
For Escambia
County this result is not surprising, because officials in that county disabled the machine option that would have informed each voter that extra marks were on the ballot and given the voter a chance to submit a corrected ballot (Roy and Damron 2001a) . In Columbia
County the ballot-correction feature seems also not to have been functioning in many precincts (e.g. Roy and Damron 2001a) , even though years after the fact county election officials continue to believe that the feature was activated throughout the county (Singletary 2003) . The ballot-correction feature was also disabled in Manatee County (Damron and Roy 2001) , where the ratios are lower than in Columbia or Escambia counties but are substantially above the median ratios for precinct-tabulated counties.
4 Interestingly, Lake is the only county that used centrally tabulated optical scan equipment for which the ratio of the Gore ratio to the Bush ratio is greater for the two-mark allocated overvotes than it is for the multiple-mark allocated overvotes. This result supports reports that the small print on the ballot especially confused some voters who could not distinguish "Lieberman" from "Libertarian" and hence marked their ballots for both Gore and Libertarian Harry Browne (Damron and Shaw 2001) .
Are Many Marks a Vote?
Which of these prima facie ambiguous ballots actually represent votes that were intended for one of the major party candidates? There is no way to determine this with certainty for any individual ballot. It is possible, however, to get a useful estimate of the proportion of the two-mark and multiple-mark ballots that can be interpreted as conveying a specific vote intention. In every county, the proportions are smaller when there is more than one mark on the ballot for president than when there is only one mark. The pattern of decreases in the proportion of ballots that have a valid vote for a major party Senate candidate, as the number of marks increases, does not mean that two-mark and multiple-mark voters are that much more likely to vote for a third-party candidate. Rather the pattern mostly reflects a phenomenon Herron and Sekhon (2003) documented using ballot image data for
Broward and Miami-Dade counties, which is that voters who overvote for president tend also to have overvotes for other offices. I interpret this pattern as indicating that some of the ballots that have more than one mark convey an intention to vote for one of the major party candidates, as the singly marked ballots do, but some of the ballots that have more than one mark are meaningless.
The simplest version of the idea underlying this interpretation begins with the thought that there are two kinds of voters. Call them true voters and random voters. Assume that all voters who mark only one candidate for president are true voters, but only a fraction of the voters who make multiple marks for president are true voters. True voters always vote so as to convey a specific voting intention, even though they sometimes make mistakes.
Random voters simply make marks at random. The conditional Senate voting behavior of the one-mark voters, given their presidential choices, is the standard for the behavior of the true voters in each county. Any discrepancy between that standard and the conditional Senate voting behavior of the two-mark or multiple-mark voters is due to the presence of random voters in those groups. The Appendix explicates this idea in more precise mathematical terms.
Using ballot image data to compute the proportion of true votes, denoted β, produces the results shown in Table 4 . The computed β ranges from a high value of 0.89 for the two-mark allocated Gore overvotes in Palm Beach County to a low of 0.03 for the multiple-mark allocated Bush overvotes in Marion County. In every case but one, β is greater for the allocated Gore overvotes than for the allocated Bush overvotes of the same type in the same county. In all but two cases β is greater for the two-mark ballots than for the multiple-mark ballots allocated to the same candidate in a county. By and large the results are reasonably well summarized by saying that a higher proportion of the overvotes allocated to Gore rather than to Bush were true votes, and many more of the two-mark overvotes than of the multiple-mark overvotes were true votes. *** Table 4 about here *** The bottom part of Table 4 shows the results of multiplying the number of allocated overvotes of each type by the corresponding β value, in order to estimate the number of true votes that were not counted because they were recorded as overvotes. The counties that have high raw numbers of allocated overvotes also tend to have high values for the proportion of them that are true votes. The result is a net gain from these ten counties of more than 22,000 votes for Gore over Bush.
To use the NORC data to apply this method to the other counties of Florida requires some imputation, because information is lacking about the distribution of Senate voting behavior given a valid (i.e., one-mark) vote for either Bush or Gore. A reasonable approach is to use values taken from the counties where ballot image data are available. 6 For each of the four types of proportions for the one-mark ballots it is reasonable to use the median among the counties as the estimate of the two key quantities when computing the proportion of true votes in the NORC data.
7
To calculate the number of true votes, I aggregate the NORC data into categories based on the type of tabulation used in each county. Aggregating avoids statistical issues associated with the small numbers that occur in the smaller counties. The principal point of the analysis does not change when the data are handled slightly differently. Table 5 reports the estimates of the true votes among the overvotes in the NORC data.
The set of counties that use Votomatic voting machines excludes Duval County, for which the proportions are reported separately. Columbia and Escambia counties are again treated separately from the other counties where precinct-tabulated optical scan systems were used. As in the results based on the ballot image data, the proportion of true votes is higher among the ballots allocated to Gore than among the ballots allocated to Bush, and 
Dispositions versus Intentions
Do true votes as estimated in Tables 4 and 5 in fact represent genuine intentions to vote for either Bush or Gore? The conditional Senate voting behavior to which the model refers is a good although certainly imperfect measure of the disposition a voter has to act a certain way on the rest of the ballot, given the way the voter behaved when voting for president.
In making the conditional behavior of one-mark voters the standard to which the behavior of two-mark and multiple-mark voters is to be compared, we are asking whether voters in the latter two groups on average have the same dispositions as voters who cast valid presidential votes. The model used to produce Tables 4 and 5 represents an effort to estimate the sizes of the subsets of two-mark and multiple-mark voters who have on average the same dispositions as the one-mark voters.
A skeptic might concede that the model is useful for estimating the sizes of those subsets but say that the model still falls short of the goal to identify the number of votes that were intended to go to either Bush or Gore. To have the same disposition to vote in a certain way for other offices, the skeptic might say, is not the same as having a specific intention to vote in a particular way for this one. The skeptic might point to studies such as There is a point beyond which no conceivable data can refute such a counterargument, but I think a case can be made for concluding that most of the estimated true votes reported in Tables 4 and 5 reflect frustrated intentions to cast a valid vote and not willful efforts to cast a spoiled ballot. The point is to observe that while the dispositional mechanism the model captures is broadly similar across the various counties, the absolute frequency with which allocated overvotes occur varies tremendously across counties.
Consider Palm Beach and Pinellas counties. In Table 4 there are some differences between the counties in the proportions of the allocated overvotes that are true votes, but the numbers are not all that different. In contrast, ratio results such as are reported in Table 3 show that allocated overvotes occur in Palm Beach County at a rate roughly five times the rate they occur in Pinellas County. Undoubtedly the butterfly ballot used in Palm Beach caused many more voters to make mistakes there, but it is hard to believe that the ballot caused more voters to spoil their ballots intentionally.
Perhaps the results for counties that use precinct-tabulated optical scan machines should be viewed as the hardest test for the claim to be measuring intentions and not merely dispositions. After all, the stylized story about those counties is that every voter who attempted to cast a ballot containing overvotes was confronted with a warning and given a chance to submit another ballot. In fact the implementation of this ideal warn-and-correct scenario was less than perfect. Columbia County is hardly the only county for which defective procedures have been documented (for examples from Bay and
Orange counties see Roy and Griffin 2001) . Without knowing for sure that the overvotes from the precinct-tabulated optical scan counties that seem to be true votes originate with voters who received a warning and yet did not correct the ballot, the results for these counties cannot be the basis of a compelling objection to the conclusion that the model is recovering mostly bona fide intended votes.
Election Reform
The official outcome of the 2000 presidential election in Florida was a complete disaster.
Just taking into account the allocated overvotes that reflect genuine intentions to vote for either Bush or Gore, more than 57,000 voters who went to the polls on election day had their voting intentions frustrated. If none of the administrative defects that caused those intended votes not to be counted had existed, Gore would have won the state by more than 35,000 votes instead of losing by 537 votes. Taking these frustrated votes into account, the election was close, but not all that close-not exactly "poised on a knife edge," as some have written (Apple 2000) . The administrative problems turned a clear Gore victory into a narrow loss.
The administrative problems in Florida in 2000 go beyond the much maligned butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County. Voters' intentions were frustrated throughout the state.
Having the butterfly ballot certainly caused more overvotes to occur. But in proportional terms it was just as bad for a county to use a Datavote punch card voting machine with the candidates' names printed on two pages, and worse still to use a centrally tabulated optical scan system with the candidates names printed in two columns. election if that reform had been in effect at that time? It is a fraught enterprise to consider such a counterfactual, but the most straightforward, ballpark answer is to refer to Table 3 and imagine that the frequency of allocated overvotes throughout the state is reduced to the level typically occurring in precinct-tabulated optical scan counties. Among the latter set of counties (excluding Columbia and Escambia), the median ratio of overvotes to certified vote counts is 0.001. Using the ballpark method, the frequency of allocated overvotes in Votomatic counties-except Duval and Palm Beach-would typically have fallen by a factor of about five. In Duval and Palm Beach, assuming better designed ballots were also used there, the reduction would have been by a factor on the order of 50. In counties that used Datavote machines or centrally tabulated optical scan equipment, the Table 3 the error rate for Union County, which used paper ballots, is as high as the rate in the optically scanned county that listed the candidates in a single column.
Election administration reform in
HAVA calls for all states to obtain voting equipment that complies with federal standards, but those standards refer to the technical operating characteristics of the machines and "are not intended to define appropriate election administration practices" No such policy exists currently, either in Florida or elsewhere, but nonetheless it is vitally important that efforts be undertaken to collect such information in a systematic manner. The fact that the residual vote is reduced is not enough to guarantee that meaningful votes are not being lost. The median ratio of allocated overvotes to certified votes was only 0.001 in Florida counties that used precinct-tabulated optical scan systems, but the results in Table 5 suggest nonetheless that many of those overvotes represent frustrated true votes. To refer to the familiar automated banking machine norm, would anyone accept a banking machine that threw away one cent out of every ten dollars a customer requested?
In today's large, polarized and closely divided electorates, even an error rate of one in a thousand intended votes lost may be too high. Among the goals of election reform should be the standard that no meaningful vote goes uncounted. Ballot-level data are needed to monitor how closely that standard is being approached. To let an election again be awarded to one candidate when another was the voters' intended choice would be beyond outrageous.
To describe precisely the procedure used to estimate the proportion of true votes among the allocated overvotes, let P 1 denote the observed proportion of one-mark voters who cast a Senate vote for one of the major party candidates, and let P 2 denote the observed proportion of two-mark voters who do so. Assume that P 1 is the rate at which all true voters vote for a major party candidate. The rate at which random voters do so is an unknown quantity denoted H. P 2 is an average of the rates P 1 and H, weighted by the unknown proportion of true voters among the two-mark voters. Let β denote that proportion. Then
For the additional information needed to find β, let S 1 denote the observed proportion 
Equation (1) implies α = βP 1 /P 2 , so, substituting for α, equation (2) can be solved for β:
If we assume that the random voters who happen to have picked Bush are truly choosing at random between McCollum and Nelson, then it is reasonable to set R = 1/2.
The other four quantities needed to compute β from equation (3) are all observed, so the stated model gives a practical procedure for computing the proportion of true votes among the two-mark overvotes allocated to Bush. It is straightforward to apply the procedure both to the overvotes allocated to Gore and to the allocated multiple-mark overvotes.
Inspecting the ballot-image data shows that there is a problem with this simple model because for Broward County S 2 > S 1 for Gore, and for Highlands and Hillsborough counties there is the analogous problem with the multiple-punch overvotes allocated to Gore. In terms of the model, this is possible only if S 1 < R. To cover these exceptional cases we would need R ≥ 0.95 for the random voters who happened to have made marks for Gore.
Such a high value for R would raise a question about how random the so-called random voters really are in these cases. The amount by which S 2 exceeds S 1 is small, however.
Rather than complicate the model, I simply set (S 2 − R)/(S 1 − R) = 1 whenever S 2 > S 1 . 
